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Several high-level meetlngs have taken place over the last few months
behreen the Unlted States and the European Comunity. As the EC knows from
dlscusslons at those meetlngs the U.S. contlnues to be concerned about the
prcblems created by the European Comnunity in its implementation of the
Comon Agricultural Pol icy.
t{e rccognize the policy prerogatives of the European Comnunity to pursue
the satisfaction of internal obJectives for its agricultural sector.
Howeyer, when the implementation of EC governmental policy in pursuit of
tlrose obJectives becomes detrimental to the well being of U.S. farmers, it
becomes imperative that the U.S. government act to protect the interests of
U.S. agrlculture. Such has become the case.
The economist, Adam Smith, in the late lSth century documented the
advantages of frce and unfettercd markets and the merit of a'laissez-faire
approach to those markets by governments. And David Ricardo, in the ear'ly
I9th century, ar{rued for frce trade and against the Britlsh Corn Laws, a
trade rbstrictlve measuFe not unlike the modern variable leyy mechanlsm of
the CAP.
Over the last I 112 decades the U.S. has made great strides in noving
Government Agrlcultural policy away from lnter"ference with the market.
Today our domestic prlces and world market prices are the same for most
maJor agriculture conrnoditles. For the most part our agricultural sector
adJusts fully and freely to the lnternational market. The EC, as the other
maJor agricultural trader in the world today, is ful'ly insulated from the
international market. And that causes the U.S. severe problems.
2The follorlng evid'ence has been complled showing how EC policy actions
have been hamful to the agrlcultural producers of the U.S. and those of a
number of oilter countrles around the globe. l{e also suggest some rsnedial
actlons we belleve necessary by the EC to show good faitJr in proceeding
torad an acceptable solutlon to our prcblems.
Our corcerns about the effects of the way the CAP has been.implemented
center in thnee aFeas -
l. fie stifling of EC internal demand for food products.
2. EC subsldized conpetitlon rlth us and other expolters in thid
mar*ets, and
3. the added lnstability that the EC transmits into the world mat*ets
by malntainlng rlgldly stable lnternal prlces and tltus insulating member
countrles from the adJustments slgnaled by the international martet.
Internal Demand. .Several analyses.are available that show the effects
of tfie CAF on EC food demand. For example:
-- A 1958 USDA study covering $e gralns, livestock, dait? and sugar
prrducts estimates the EC consumer cost of the CAP in that year to be
$6.4 blllion.
-- A partial update of that study for 1978 shows the EC consuter cost of
the CAP for Just 4 grains (soft rheat, dunm, barley, rlce) and sugar to
be $3.7 bllllon dollars.
-- A recent t{orld Bank study shows the net soclal loss from misalloca-
tlon of Fesourres due to CAP prlce dlstoftlons ln wheat, corn, barley,
sugar and beef in France, Germany, and the UK to tota'l as high as $1 .4
billion. The wel'fare transfers from consumers to producers was
estlmated as high as $6.7 bllllon.
3-- Per caplta consumptlon levels of various food products are
enllgfitenlng. ln 1978 the U.S. per caplta consunptlon of meat was 29.5
kllograms gg!q, tian tiat ln the EC; of dalry prcducts I0 kllograms
greater and of cereal products 19 kilograms ]9. Per capita beef
consumption in Ure EC at 25 l(ilograms ls 1 lrilogram less than in the
USSR. The average U.S. consumer spent 16% of income on food while the
EC consumer spent finm a low of 2% of income on food in the Netherlands
to a high of 457 ln lreland.
The point is that the hlgh agricultural prices within the EC have
stifled consumer demand for food. l{e estimate that if EC agricultural
prlces were atworld market levels the EC rould be lmporLlng an additional
6.5 million metric tons of feed gralns, an addltional I million tons of
bread wheat and perhdps I.5 mllllon tons less of soybeans.
Subsidized thlr{ matet cornpetitlon. l{e maintain that the EC has become
a maJor world exporter of agricultural'prcducts laryely Utrough the use of
export subsidles provlded thrcugh the CAP.
Since its lnceptlon, Ure Comon Agrlcultural Policy has been operated to
malntaln high and stable lnternal prlces wlthout any mechanism to limit the
extra production ellclted by Utose high and'rlskless prlce suppott
measunes. Thls excess and growing production has first displaced EC imports
and, then as lt grew larger has been dlsposed larjely through subsidlzed
prices into the internatlonal mar*ets, thus further dlsplaclng our and other
countrles mone efflclent exports.
During the period of the operation of the CAP the EC has moved from a
substantial importer to a siglficant exporter of a latge number of maJor
agrlcultnral products. EC exports as a perrentage of world trade in frnd
4pnoducts have increased fircm 9.3 percent in 1973 to ll.4 perrent in 1980.
t{e stress that this increase has been achieved laryely through the apolica-
tion of export subsidfes. lhrlng the same period, the EC's sharc of world
inrpofts declined from 24.7 percent to 19.5 percent. Thus EC net imports of
food prcducts drcpped frcm 15.4 percent in'1973 to 8.2 percent in 1980.
These are not our numbers, they arc statistics published by the GATT.
Clearly Ure Comunity has moved beyond self-sufficiency tlrrough its
pricing policies. One measurc of the effectlveness of the CAP levy system
in protecting EC pr.oducers fi'om imports ls the difference in the rate of
grcwttr lp EC imports of levy yersus non-levy products. U.S. exports of levy
items lncrcased in value terms by 2.6 tlmes between 1970 and 1979 whi'le
exports of non-Iery items lncreased by 4.1 tlmes. As a percent of total
agricultural exports by the U.S. to the EC, variable levy items decreased
from 31?, 1n 1970 to Zfr in 1979.
The move to self-sufflclency on the basis of high suppoft prices reduced
the EC market opportunities for traditlonal expolters. The move @!
self-sufflcency has spllled over lnto the international mar*et through
subsldlzed EC exports that cornpete unfalrly with tradltlonal exporters ln
thld mar*ets.
--In gralns, last year for the flrst time slnce the inception of
the CAP the EC became a net graln exporler. The Comunity ls now
challenglng Australla as the thir{ lalgest wheat exporter with
15.52 of total world wheat exports. This has occurred because of
subsldles and increased levels of import protection. The import
levies on corn and wheat during the'last 15years have risen. The
talget price for corn, for example, has been increased nearly three
5tirnes as fast as the intervention price durlng this period. This
slowly but surcIy shuts out inpofts and contravenes botJt the spirit
and lntent of GATT.
Domestic graln consumptlon in the EC-10 increased by nearly 9
milllon metr"lc tons from 1970/n to 1979/80 (to 122.2 ml]'lion mt) ,
but the comunlty reduced lts net imports from 22.3 nlllion mt in
1970/7f to 2.5 mi]llon mt ln I979l80. In the 1980/81 the EC became
a net exporter of 3.8 miltlon mt and net exports are also
antlclpated for 1981/'82. For coarse grains, net imports declined
fi'om 15.8 million mt in 1970/n to 9.3 mllllon mt in 1979/80, in
splte of an lncrcase in domestic consunption of I million nmt
during the same years. In 1980/81 there was a fufther dec'line in
net fuports to 6.8 mllllon tons.
--In sugar, EC exports have soated from 2.1 mll1lon mt in 1976/77
to 4.5 mllllon mt ln 1980/8I. Thls has had a tremendous impact on
the world and the p.S. mar*ets and has affected sugar exports from
Arstralla, Brazll, and $e Phillppines. The U.S. sugar industry
estlmates that EC export subsldies, which are nesponsible for world
sugirrmarlcet prlce levels, have cost U.S. lndustrles $2..l bllllon
ln lost'feyenue. l{e would not have the type of sugar suppott\
program that ras passed by the U.S. Congress lf lt werc not for the
prlce depresslng effects of EC sugar export subsldles.
--In poultty, the EC has moved finm the worlds latTest imporLer Lo
suraassing the U.S. ln I970 to become the world's largest
exporter. Tte Comunity now accounts for 35 percent of the worl d
broiler mal*et.
6In--In beef and veal, for many years the EC was a net lmpolter.
1973174, howeyer, the EC reached self-sufflcle:::y. Thereafter
pr.oductlon contlnued to lncrease while consumptlon remained
stable. This has resulted ln the EC moving from a net impolter
posltion to tJte second largest exporter of beef in the world for
the last two years, behind only Australia.
--In fruit, Ute EC pr.ocessing subsldles pose a serious thrtat to
U.S. producers. The recently introduced subsidles for Greek raisin
prcducers have vlrtually stopped U.S. raisln exports to the EC.
This policy whlch also applies to canned fruits impairs bindings
given in good faith by fie Comunity durlng GATT negotiatlons.
Transmlssion of instabillty. EC policies also contribute to increased
world market instability. By malntainlng a rigid internal price structur=
under the CAP and insulating the EC agrlcultural sector from the interna-
tlonal market, Ure EC'forces oUrer countries to bear the bnrnt of lnterna-
tlonal madret lnstablllty. Although some of $e less developed countries
are least able to cope wlth these dlstortlons, the U.S. also must adJust
bofi prcductlon and consumptlon to accomrodate EC ma*et dlstofting
practfces. As one lndlcator of lncrcased mar*et lnstabllity, USDA analysts
estlmate that present U.S. exporB volume proJections are subJect to a
forccast error of: 12 perrent or 15 million metrlc tons, up substantially
firm a forecast error of + 8 per=ent or 5.5 mlllion metric tons ln 1950.
t{hile the EC ls not accountable for all of this gr.owing lnstaollity, as
a maJor agricultural trader lt must accept responsibillty for lts fair
share. And we fully expect the E.C. to share the bur{en with the U.S.
7ftus as we step back and look at the CAP as lt has developed over the
last 20years, tre see a policy that has resulte;l in high and rigld internal
support prices that have incrcased prcductlon and slowed consunptlon to such
an extent that the Conmunlty is now a major exporter of most maJor food
ptoducts. This was achieved because product suraluses to the domestic
market were pushed lnto export through the aid of export subsidles, furLher
exacerbating the instability of world markets.
The cost for these policles has soar=d enormously, to the point where
the EC budget for dir=ct market support in 1982 is prcJected to exceed $14
bi'llion with about 50 perncent of those expendltur.es going to export
subsidies. In addltion, some $20 blllion nlII be spent by the Member States
on agricultural support programs.
Qulte frankly we feel that this approach has gotten out of hand. The
sharp incrcase ln EC exports is irnposing a serious burden on U.S. farmers
who have become increaslngly dependent-during the past 20 years on expolt
markets. Today nearly 40 percent of U.S. cr.opland ls devoted to export
prcduction. Unfalr competltion by foreign competltors in the form of expolt
subsidles thrcaten our exporL markets and the Ilvellhood of U.S. producers.
An unfolding political dlfflculQ for this Administration ls the 40 perrent
decllne ln net U.S. farm lncome ln l98l that ln rcal terms constitutes the
Iowest level of net farn lncotme slnce the Depresslon. Because of low grain
prlces, we expect have to make deficiency payments to farmers totaling more
than $500 mllllon ln FY 1982. Further, we are now proJecting the value of
our exporLs thls year wlll fal'l below last years level. This will be the
first downturn in exports since .l969.
I
In thls envlromnent USDA has had to abandon its posltion against
prcduction controls and announce set asirl.e Prograns. If we achieve producer
particlpatlon in the rheat set aslde program for the 1982183 ct'op year of
about l0 percent, lt will result ln a decrease ln U.S. wheat productlon of
about 7.5 milllon mt. That ls nearly the amount by which the EC has
ircr.eased lts wheat exports to world mal*ets over the past three seasons.
USDA analysts have estimated the effects on the U.S. and other suppliers
if in 1981 the EC would have exported only 7 million metric tons of wheat (a
more historical level ) raUrer than the I4.5 milllon metric tons tiat were
shipped. The U.S. would have exported 4.1 million tons more, Canada l
milllon tons more, Australla 200 tlrousand tons more and Atgentina 100
thousand tons mott.
The U.S. producer price for wheat (and thus the world price) would have
been 50 cents per bushel higher rcsultlng in an incFease in net fam lncome
for U.S. producers of I.7 bl'tllon dollars.
Even if the EC would have substltuted 5 of the 7 mlllion tons of EC
wheat for imported corn, the prlce of corn would have decreased only 13
cents per bushel and Ure net farn income galn to U.S. prcducers would still
have been 800 ml'llion dollars.
The polnt ls that EC subsidlzed expotts arg huftlng the U.S. Hlgh
lnternal EC prlces stifle food demand by consuners, some of which would be
satisfled by irnports. Subsldlzed exports add supplles into the world
mar*et. Both of these actlons deprcss world market prices and tltus our
domestic pr.oducer prlces. This results ln higher farm program costs for
both the EC and the U.S. EC consumers bear the bur{en. U.S. producers bear
the bur{en. And taxpayers on both sides of the Atlantic bear the butden.
9If we cannot rcsolYe our dlfferences, we ane on a colllslon course.
Last November when EC offlclalg rere herc they spoke of refom of the CAP.
The U.S. applauds the internal EC dlscusslons now undelay'on the need for
CAP refom. The proposal to phase EC prices to world mar*et levels is most
welcome. But we must ask how this convergence will take place when the
Comission is pr"oposlng an ayerage increase ln prices for I982183 of about
6.6 perrent. And agaln target prlces would be incrcased morc (7%) than
intervention prlces, increasing further the Ievels of EC protection for
grains.
The U.S. cannot tolerate the dvolutlon of the CAP to a Conunon ExporL
Policy as Ure proposals lmply. The prcposals are si'lent on the subiect of
export subsidles. As re have lndlcated, EC export subsidies are the single
rnost harmful of EC pollcles. The U.S. must see an acceptable plan and
timetable for thelr elimination.
The proposals indlcate a target volume of grain production of I30
mllllon mt excludlng durum by 1988. To achieve that taryet would take an
annual rate of productlon increase of I .7%, significantly lower than the EC
hlstorlcal rate of yleld lncrease. The proposed reduction of I3 in the
lnterventlon prlce ln the follorlng year for each mlllion tons of production
oyer the target volume sesrs to be a rather mild price penalty. Is the EC
prcfrrcd to lmpose production controls if necessarry? And what level of
export do the volure targets lmply?
Whlle the EC proposes phaslng lnternal prlces to world levels by 1988.
No$lng is said about the level of thrcshold prices at that point. To share
ln the internatlonal mar*et instability, it is important that EC border
'10
. protectlon be keyed to world prlce movements ln such a way that EC
prrductlon and consumptlon wlll adJust on the basis of world market
condltlons. Such adJustnent would also rcquire lncreased stocklng levels ln
the EC.
To surmarize, we do not question the Eurcpean Comrunity's right to
expor.E agricultural products. Our concern ls that net exports from the
Cormunity not be allored to rise as long as world prlces are below EC
prices. Untll this prlnclple is allowed to prcvail, we must rcgard EC trade
policles as a mEior problem that will continue to erode the overall
rcIations bettreen our countries.
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